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Does history prove Australia is a Pacific Nation?  
 
 
A map of the southern hemisphere shows Australia is a vast, arid continent with 22 
million Australians squashed mostly into the south-eastern corner, while to the east and 
covering one-third of the Earth’s surface, a few million Pacific Islanders occupy minute atolls 
or long chains of volcanic archipelago, and are spread thinly across Oceania. But it only takes 
a quick look at an airline route map with its red lines spraying out from eastern Australian 
capital cities, or the nightly weather reports on television, to see that the islands are close. 
‘Across the Coral Sea’ is a catchy phrase, and relevant when considering that Brisbane is 
closer to Port Moresby, Honiara, Port Vila and Noumea — the capital of four foreign 
countries — than it is to Australia’s southern capital cities.  Australians have always had a 
good geographical sense of place — of being close to the South Seas as the islands were first 
known. The sense of being in, or close to, the Pacific originated in Sydney and Hobart’s role 
as founding ports on the western edge of the Pacific and entrepôt in a global trade that linked 
the islands, Asia, Europe and the new Australasian colonies. This understanding of place was 
later expanded through travelogues, illustrated newspapers, lantern slides, postcards and 
exhibitions that were popular at the end of the 19th and early in the 20th century.1  
Sundays offered Australians a vicarious access as Missions and Churches raised funds 
using lantern slides and the pulpit for evangelical work in the Islands. Australia at times tried 
to create a sub-empire in the Pacific, and succeeded in 1919 in acquiring a Mandate and later 
Trusteeship responsibilities for Nauru and north-eastern New Guinea, two former German 
territories. Hoping to add to an existing colony in Papua, at times the Australian 
governments, visionaries and the Churches pushed hard for Great Britain to acquire the New 
Hebrides (Vanuatu) or to pass over control of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate to 
Australian control, and Fiji was in many respects a de facto Australian colony, dominated by 
Australian firms, banks and traders. After the Second World War, there was also discussion 
of adding Dutch New Guinea to Australian Papua and the United Nations Trusteeship in 
Northeast New Guinea, combining the three as one territory under Australian and United 
Nations control.  
In the immediate post WWII years the Pacific islands were relegated to insignificance 
as Australia clung to its European ties and then pushed its involvement in global conflicts and 
alliances more towards Asia and the USA. In the 1980s, a political scientist, Greg Fry, 
summed up indifference towards the Pacific by coining the phrase that it was “falling off the 
map”2 and in 2003, the columnist Graeme Dobell characterised Australia’s policy as 
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dominated by ‘policy taboos, popular amnesia and political failure’.3 Aid, trade, security and 
defence have been the relationships that dominated government discourse on the region since 
1945, but three other “isms” capture the nature of the relationship – regionalism, tourism and 
volunteerism. 
 Beginning with plans laid as the Pacific War drew to a close; Australia promoted the 
idea of regional unity; an enlarged Western democratic alliance and Pacific Island bloc 
working together with a common purpose and common benefit for its own small territories 
and emerging nations. Australia led the formation of the South Pacific Commission (SPC), 
now the Secretariat for the Pacific Community, and a subsequent political arm, the South 
Pacific Conference, and since the 1980s, and supported a whole raft of regional organisations 
concerned with environment, fishing, shipping, education, science, communications, labour 
and trade. Australia has contributed to funding these organisations, played a crucial role in 
some, (and has been accused of dominating and interfering too much at other times) and 
continues to promote collaborative, regional development through the Pacific Plan, a 
response to the Millennium Development Goals that identified both the needs of the region, 
and strategies to implement change. 
 Tourism continues to be the most personal relationship. This began with the offering 
of cruises through the islands in the 1890s and took on new forms each decade as cruising, 
resorts, package-tours, jumbo-jets, back-packing, surfing and eco-tourism become popular to 
each new generation of Australians. These Australians claim to know the Pacific on the basis 
of a honeymoon, package trip, cruise or short resort holiday. 
 Volunteers on partially or fully funded appointments are also a significant form of 
linkage. There are official schemes but Australians also have eagerly and consistently 
demonstrated their sense of community with the islands by organising locally to build village 
health clinics, dig wells, arrange visiting medical teams, run workshops, raise funds and 
teach. Commonwealth parliamentarians in Canberra took their relationship a step further by 
creating informal PNG-Australia and Pacific-Australia Parliamentary Friendship Groups. 
Often these volunteer links developed after making personal contact during an earlier visit, 
usually a business trip, honeymoon or short holiday. Volunteers can be found in NGOs, 
religious bodies and AVI (formerly, Australian Volunteers Abroad), or in a host of other non-
government agencies and organizations. 
A welcome sign of change in Australia-Pacific relations occurred in Port Moresby in 
March 2008 when Australia’s new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, released in a joint press 
conference with Sir Michael Somare, then the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, a 
twenty-point statement now known as the “Port Moresby Declaration”. Kevin Rudd 
commented that: 
 
This Port Moresby Declaration and the Pacific development partnerships described 
in it go to two simple propositions. The first is for ourselves as Australia and the 
states of the South Pacific region. We need to ensure that our future development 
relationship is based on mutual respect, mutual partnership and mutual 
responsibility. That’s the first principle. The second is this; that when we look at the 
great challenges of development which face developing countries such as Papua 
New Guinea, we are mindful of the targets and goals which have been set by the 
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millennium development goals on education, on health and on other critical disease 
categories such as HIV-Aids and tuberculosis and malaria 
Kevin Rudd, Press Release, Port Moresby, 6 March 2008 
 
 A report on Pacific Studies in Australia released in 2009 argued that “Australians 
have a debt to honour, specifically to the Pacific Islanders once under our colonial control.”4 
In some parts of the region we have a deep and continuous relationship that now exceeds two 
hundred and twenty years. The report suggested, “We need to continue our humanitarian 
work in the region. We need to pre-empt and prepare for changes that will occur in the 
region, rather than responding with knee-jerk reactions and a fly-in, air-drop mentality 
towards emergencies as they arise. We need to move forward to a new level of understanding 
across the school and tertiary sector, and to create a critical mass of expertise on the region 
that will guide us towards a more neighbourly and rewarding relationship with the region”.5 
Australians generally, but specifically governments, agencies and institutions need to know 
more about their Pacific neighbours, especially considering Australia now spends one billion 
dollars a year in development assistance in the Pacific Islands and expects to have a 




Until the Blue Mountains were crossed and pastoral opportunities absorbed capital 
development, it was the Pacific Islands that dominated the earliest economic and trading 
ventures in Australia. Sydney and Hobart were major Pacific ports. The Pacific was the 
lifeline over which supplies, more convicts and settlers, and trading opportunities arrived on 
the east coast. Ship-building, trading for pork in Tahiti, and sandalwood, beche-de-mer and 
pearl shell in Melanesia, procuring a variety of products for the Chinese market and whaling 
and sealing, sustained the new eastern seaboard colonies and created the capital and 
investment for future expansion. The Pacific Islands were well known, discussed and 
reported on so much that historian John Young coined the phrase the “Pacific Frontier” to 
summarise the Pacific’s importance in the early history of Australia up to the 1830s.  The 
trade routes to and from Asia, through the Pacific, were integral to the development of the 
Australian east coast during the late 18th and 19th centuries. 
 By the ends of the 19th century, the Pacific had slipped from view with the exception 
of three important issues. Firstly, who was to establish colonial control of the un-claimed 
islands of the nearby Pacific? France, Russia, and Germany all loomed as security threats if 
they annexed nearby islands. During the 1870s, Queensland moved its border north through 
Torres Strait and almost to the coast of New Guinea. Australian became directly involved in 
the Pacific Islands when Queensland attempted to annex most of east New Guinea in 1883, 
and Britain finally acquiesced in 1884 and annexed British New Guinea (Southeast New 
Guinea), leaving the Northeast to the Germans. The Australasian colonies paid the cost of the 
administration of British New Guinea during the 1880s, and the Protectorate and later colony 
were partly administered from Queensland, with the Lieutenant-Governor in Port Moresby 
reporting to the Governor of Queensland. Secondly, who was to lead the evangelical 
movement as missionaries took Christianity to the Pacific Islands?   Australian Churches and 
Mission societies later took over from the original metropolitan bodies much of the 
management of missionary activity in the islands, including fund-raising, training and supply.  
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 Thirdly, who was to monopolise economic growth in terms of banking, shipping, 
mining, plantations and trading. The separate Australian colonies lobbied actively but without 
much effect to force Britain to create a British sphere of interest to Australia’s east. 
Eventually Papua, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu (in a shared condominium with France), 
Fiji, Cook Islands, Niue, Kiribati and Tuvalu and Tonga all became ‘British’. Australian 
firms, with serious competition from New Zealand firms,  began to develop links with the 
islands; Burns Philp and Company (known as BPs), the Emperor Gold Mine in Fiji, trading 
firms like Kerr and Thompson in Suva, Australian banks and even the school curriculum 
from the colonies of Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria spread to the islands. By 
1900, when the colonies federated to form the single Commonwealth of Australia, 
Australians, Australian firms and Australian investors were major players in the region. 
 Between 1863 and 1904, Queensland also developed a human trade in indentured 
labour from what are now the Loyalty Islands of New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, 
the eastern archipelagos of Papua New Guinea and Kiribati and Tuvalu. An unsavoury and 
exploitative movement of labour, the trade brought around 50,000 individual Pacific 
Islanders to Queensland on 62,000 labour contracts, whose descendants created today’s 
Australian South Sea Islander community.6 The White Australia Policy that dominated 
Australian’s attitudes to the rest of the world between the 1900s and the 1970s meant that 
during these years, Pacific Islanders were not welcome in Australia, and even Australian 
Papuans were seldom allowed to enter. Today, the presence of Pacific Islanders in Australia 
is rarely noted, and despite our long history of involvement, the region is only visible at times 
when the Pacific is a focus for the media, mostly to record coups, cyclones and disasters. 
Superficially, the Pacific is a popular setting for romantic and utopian lifestyle, reality and 
travel programs and museums, art galleries, archives and libraries in Australia have extensive 
Pacific collections and for a hundred years have held exhibitions of their Pacific material.7    
  
1901-1939; Sub-Imperialism and good prospects 
 
Promises of profitable plantations, trading and individual prosperity in ‘The Islands’ 
and calls for an Australian sub-imperialism in the southwest Pacific resonated with 
newspaper readers who had already been teased with the incentive that New Guinea and 
Samoa before the war provided Germany with large supplies of copra (and profits). By the 
time Prime Minister William Hughes arrived in London in June 1916 to argue for Australia’s 
expansion in the post-war realignment of colonial territories, the newspapers in Brisbane had 
already run news items on the prospects of ex-German colonies. In Melbourne, The Age 
voiced the opinion at the start of the war that “we have long realised that we have a Pacific 
destiny” and the post-war path could open up an Australian empire in the Pacific. James 
Burns, the head of BPs, argued in 1915, that the “natural destiny of the Pacific Islands is that 
they come under the control of Australia”. In 1915, Burns went to London to argue the case 
for a post-war realignment including the possible transfer of the Gilbert (now Kiribati), Ellice 
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(now Tuvalu), Tongan and Solomon Islands to Australian control. These arguments, with 
specific references to the administration of the Solomon Islands, were laid out in an 
anonymous series of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1915 and a pamphlet titled 
British Mismanagement in the Pacific No. 2. 
 Hughes announced in 1916 in London that Australia favoured using the equator as a 
demarcation line, with Japan conceded control of the north and Australia the south. Hughes 
called it an “Australasian Monroe doctrine in the South Pacific”. The historian, Roger 
Thompson’s evaluation of Hughes’s campaigns in London and at the Versailles Treaty 
negotiations regarding the New Hebrides and former German colonies in Nauru, New Guinea 
and the Marshall and Caroline Islands, was that Hughes’s achievements were considerable 
for a small, semi-independent power. Hughes was reported to have said in London, “the voice 
of the colonies will be dead against the return of colonies to the Huns”, at the same time as 
diplomatically claiming that for Australia “it is safety not aggrandisement we are playing 
for”. On his return, Hughes claimed he had secured for Australia the islands which were “the 
ramparts of Australia’s security” as well as a valuable monopoly over the economic trade and 
resources of Nauru and German New Guinea. 8  
Apart from mandates over Nauru (jointly with New Zealand and Great Britain) and 
German New Guinea, Australia’s relationship with the rest of the Western Pacific remained 
as it had been before the war. The Governor-General in despatches to London noted it was a 
topic not much mentioned at public meetings in Australia. By 1920, the expansionist period 
was over. None of the predictions of Hughes and other expansionists came true. Australia 
gained New Guinea and a joint mandate (with Great Britain and New Zealand) over Nauru, 
but the Solomon Islands remained a British protectorate. In 1925, Round Table, a new forum 
and journal on imperial affairs, reviewed the first 20-year period of Australian administration 
in Papua and asked why plantations had not been profitable. The problems of inappropriate 
administration policies, falling commodity prices, world war, unavailability of labour and the 
“crowning horror” of the restrictive Navigation Act (Australia, 1912), suggested that 
Australia was not well equipped to administer Pacific territories. 
 For the first half of the 20th century, geographically Australia was part of the Pacific, 
and historically the Commonwealth of Australia was involved in the Pacific in labour, 
commerce, and trade in tropical produce, as well as colonial administration.  But this 
relationship was not particularly caring or close, and it was unequal, paternalistic and 
sometimes racist, exacerbated by the size differences in land masses, economies and 
populations.   
  
1939–1990: War, indifference, and neglect 
 
The Pacific War briefly dominated Australian perceptions of the region. Icons such as 
the ‘Coastwatchers’, the ‘Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angels’, and the ‘Digger’ plodding up a muddy, 
twisting track on a sharp jungle ridge were easily recognised. There was little 
acknowledgement of the changes wrought by war on Pacific peoples. During the War 
Australia started proactively to plan for the post-war period, and the South Pacific 
Commission (established in 1947) was one of the outcomes as Australia planned to play a 
more assertive role in the region. Australia also lobbied successfully to create a single 
administration for the two parts of New Guinea it now controlled—Papua as a colony and 
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New Guinea as a Trusteeship. Under Australian administration, thousands of kiaps, didimen, 
planters and government officials, teachers, health workers and missionaries and their 
families developed close relationships with Papuans and New Guineans and contributed to 
the country’s development. The Australian children who grew up in New Guinea, along with 
the Papuans and New Guineans educated in Australia, created lasting trans-national personal 
ties.9 Australia maintained its administrative control over Nauru (in a phosphate mining and 
trusteeship arrangement with New Zealand and Britain). Nearby the phosphate rich island of 
Banaba (Ocean Island) was also for all intents an Australian outpost. The Colonial Sugar 
refinery (CSR), a giant Australian firm, dominated Fiji’s economy and politics, and 
elsewhere, Australians served as store-keepers, teachers, shipping agents and bankers or 
established tourist resorts and hotels.  
 But after the war, ‘The Islands’ slipped from the public consciousness. The winds of 
change that swept the region, ending colonial regimes and creating new micro-nations in 
Samoa, Cook Islands, Nauru, Tonga, Fiji and finally Papua New Guinea in 1975, were not 
well understood. Australia was attacked on the international stage for its tardy development 
approaches, colonialist stance and slowness to respond to decolonisation initiatives, and may 
be said to have reluctantly granted Nauru its independence in 1968, and then gave Papua New 
Guinea its independence too quickly — in a rush from 1972 to 1975. Australia supported, 
without vocally speaking out for independence, the next series of neighbouring independent 
nations — Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tuvalu, but acquiesced to the Indonesia 
invasion and takeover in the 1960s of West Papua, the former Dutch colony. Then in a further 
reversal of policy in the 1980s, Australia actively supported indigenous Kanak independence 
in the French territory of New Caledonia.  
 The Pacific slipped further back from view as Asia became the new catchcry of the 
1980s and Australia pushed Asian Studies in schools and universities, and international travel 
opened up Europe and Asia as a destination, eventually becoming far more popular than a trip 
to the Islands. In the period from 1970 to 2010, new dynamics were affecting relationships 
between the island nations themselves, between these new nations and their former colonial 
overlords and between the Pacific region and the rest of the world. 
 
1990 - 2010; Intense, Uneven and lacking Direction 
 
By 1990, Australians were comfortably secure in a military alliance with a major 
world power, and actively seeking to develop a presence in Asia. A working relationship with 
smaller island neighbours in the Pacific was not a priority.  By 2010, policy amnesia and  
certainty had been challenged by unexpected events in the region, three changes of 
government within Australia and a realisation that Australia was once again isolated in the 
antipodes and at best a middle order player in global politics. 
 By 1990, the Australian public was reasonably well-informed on global issues but the 
Pacific Islands were mostly peripheral in this era of rising global awareness. So, a strategic 
policy of limited engagement, secondary to maintaining diplomatic, trade, aid and cultural 
ties with Asian neighbours rather than the Pacific, seemed to offer, for both the Labour and 
Liberal/National Party Governments, a long term safeguard for Australia. Under the 
leadership of Prime Ministers Robert Hawke and Paul Keating, the Labour Government 
promoted trade links and Australia’s membership of regional Pacific organizations. This 
policy was reversed by the Liberal/National Government led by Prime Minister John Howard 
that held power during 1996–2007, with the exception of two manipulative actions, using 
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Papua New Guinea and Nauruan refugee camps to solve problems with illegal refugees out of 
Asia, and through the large scale of the RAMSI intervention in Solomon Islands. 
These two decades had seen a crisis loom in our northern neighbours East Timor and 
West New Guinea (formerly known as Irian Jaya, and now Papua Barat and Papua 
Provinces).  Australia stood by inactive while violence marred the vote on East Timor’s 
future, and only became proactive under UN auspices as part of an international force that 
came too late to prevent the orchestrated violence against East Timor and its people. In Papua 
New Guinea there was a sequence of incidents; squabbles over the proposed Sandline 
mercenary solution in Bougainville, a breakdown in communication over the policing 
provisions of the new ECP (Enhanced Cooperation Program), the Julian Moti affair (allowing 
him to travel between Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands), Prime Minister Somare’s 
shoes (after he was forced to remove them when passing through an Australian airport 
security checkpoint) and a failure to help solve the Bougainville civil war, made relations 
with Papua New Guinea uncertain and testy. Diplomatic stand-offs with Vanuatu over the 
role of Australian diplomats, and sanctions against Fiji after coups in 2000 and 2006, meant 
Australia’s relations with the region were unstable.  Military engagement in Timor-Leste and 
the Solomon Islands were claimed by the government and the media as a great moral victory 
and demonstration of Australia’s role as ‘deputy sheriff’ on behalf of the Western democratic 
alliance. The 2,300-strong military intervention force in the Solomon Islands in 2003 was led 
by Australia but only after Prime Minister Howard twice refused invitations to go to the 
Solomon Islands to help quell an emerging civil war and breakdown of government. The 
eventual intervention in Solomon Islands changed to a state-building, ten-year bureaucratic 
and administrative support program known by its acronym RAMSI (Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands). 
 In 1990, in regard to the Pacific Islands, Australia had seemed relatively well 
positioned. A Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs had been recently established and Trade, 
Foreign Affairs and other Ministers regularly visited the region. Prime Ministers Hawke and 
Keating attended the annual meetings of the Pacific Forum, the major meeting of heads of 
governments of independent Pacific nations. In 1992, Brisbane hosted the annual Pacific 
Forum meeting and throughout the 1990s, Australia continued its high level of aid to the 
region, including budget support for regional organizations such as the Secretariat for the 
Pacific Community (SPC) based in Noumea and The University of the South Pacific. In 
1996, the Government began to fund the State Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) 
project at ANU to encourage scholarship on Melanesia and to assist in briefing and policy 
making. In 1998, the Government funded a short-lived Centre for the Contemporary Pacific 
at ANU and a new three-year seminar and publications program linking Australia and the 
region was also funded. In 2005, another Commonwealth funded program began to promote 
excellence in Asia-Pacific Studies began (known as ICEAPS), and this led to the creation of 
the Australian Association for the Advancement of Pacific Studies (AAAPS). In late 2007, 
policies were reconsidered again under the new Labour Government led by Kevin Rudd. A 
new position as Parliamentary Secretary for the Pacific Islands was created; although not a 
Ministerial or cabinet position, this was perceived as sign of a revived interest in the region. 
And, in March 2008, the Port Moresby Declaration, announced during a visit by Prime 
Minister Rudd to Papua New Guinea, signalled a new engagement with the Pacific Islands.   
But by 2010, Australia’s relationship with Pacific nations, bilaterally and 
multilaterally had started to crumble. Australian bureaucrats, politicians and journalists began 
to promote the idea that the Pacific was a basket case of unstable, corrupt economies 
(popularly known as the ‘Doomsday Scenario’). Australia argued negatively and in a 
derogatory tone that island nations had little chance for real development unless they joined 
together as a bloc.  The DFAT and AusAID rhetoric framed the island nations as remote, 
weak, fragile and fragmented. This portrayal was rejected by Island leaders at the annual 
Pacific Forum meetings, a platform that became increasingly anti-Australian after the 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard stayed away from several meetings. Australia’s 
position in the region became untenable when it was unable to intervene in any positive way 
to help its former colony, Papua New Guinea, bring closure to the civil war on Bougainville 
Island. This was particularly embarrassing when New Zealand brokered a series of treaty 
negotiations and Australia was at best a late arriving, third party. By 1999, Australian soldiers 
were in Bougainville as part of a peace keeping force, but this was not highlighted by either 
the government or the media, and was eventually overshadowed by the Australian military 
role in the East Timor INTERFET peace keeping force and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands.  
 During the 1980s and again in the 1990s, the relationship with the region had at times 
been decidedly sour.  The Australian High Commissioner was expelled from Vanuatu for 
speaking out publicly on domestic matters, Australia bullied Pacific nations into appointing 
an Australian to head the main regional organization, Nauru won an out-of-court settlement 
over Australian responsibility for environmental damage from phosphate mining during 
Australia’s UN Trusteeship period,  and in 1987 Australia had to retreat from condemnation 
(and sanctions) of the Rabuka-led coups in Fiji, when other island nations offered their 
support for the indigenous cause in Fiji. In 2000, Australia’s role in the region was further 
compromised by an inability to act decisively when a coup in support of indigenous Fijian 
interests was declared in Fiji to mask the criminal action of taking thirty members of 
Parliament hostage for 55 days. A few weeks later, when ethnic rivalry in the Solomon 
Islands led to the parliament being suspended and the capital city, Honiara, was captured by 
armed militia, Australia was reluctant to act, resorting only to the forced evacuation of all its 
nationals. In 1998, in Papua New Guinea, the secret use of mercenaries to bring a final 
solution to the conflict in Bougainville was exposed over Port Moresby radio and eventually 
Sir Julius Chan lost the Prime Ministership and his seat in Parliament. Australia had to sit 
back and watch these events unfold, offering only advice,  several quickly arranged visits by 
Ministers and a visit by Chan to Australia for “consultation”.  
 Good governance and nation-building have dominated foreign policy and 
development assistance discourse in Australia. This is the central problem. Pacific national 
boundaries were largely based on nineteenth century territorial divisions that were originally 
arbitrary dotted lines on maps, decided in London, Berlin or Paris. But fourteen nations are 
now spread across diverse archipelagos, incorporating many languages from an enormous 
variety of cultures, with no interest in or recent historical or cultural connections with 
Australia. Should Australia play the heavy hand and intervene directly in the domestic affairs 
of its newly emerging and at times struggling nations and neighbours? If it takes this course 
of action Australia risks censure, but if it sits back and plays the responsible international 
mediatory role, it is equally seen to be abrogating its neighbourly responsibilities to help 
those in need. What is the responsibility of the government to Australian taxpayers — should 
the government condone blatant misuse of aid, cooperation and loans if these prop up a small 
nation alleged to be poorly governed, in debt, corrupt and undemocratic? This balancing act 
has played out in post-2006 relations with the military dictatorship in Fiji, on the one hand 
pouring in $300k plus in aid money annually to local networks and grassroots projects, while 
maintaining a diplomatic stand off and travel embargo. This uncertainty, and the related 
policy, strategic and diplomatic implications that follow, have reflecting badly on Australia as 
‘incidents’ followed one after the other over the last twenty years. Australian governments 
have been unable to arrive at a long-term policy of mutually beneficial engagement with its 
neighbouring Pacific Islands region. A decade into the 21st century, Australia continues to 
struggle to establish a positive, forward-looking policy of collaborative engagement with the 
region. In the Pacific, the popular image remained of a wealthy, often friendly and generous 
neighbour but equally of a culturally-insensitive, indifferent regional bully. 
 
4926 words. 
 
 
